I frequently recommend Signal as a secure messaging platform because it strikes a good balance between security and usability. Unfortunately, as is always the case with security, the balance between security and usability involves trade-offs. One of the trade-offs made by Signal has recently become the subject of some controversy:

When Signal Desktop is installed, it will create an encrypted SQLite database called db.sqlite, which is used to store the user’s messages. The encryption key for this database is automatically generated by the program when it is installed without any interaction by the user.

As the encryption key will be required each time Signal Desktop opens the database, it will store it in plain text to a local file called %AppData%\Signal\config.json on PCs and on a Mac at ~/Library/Application Support/Signal/config.json.

When you open the config.json file, the decryption key is readily available to anyone who wants it.

How could the developers of Signal make such an amateurish mistake? I believe the answer lies in the alternative:

Encrypting a database is a good way to secure a user’s personal messages, but it breaks down when the key is readily accessible to anyone. According to Suchy, this problem could easily be fixed by requiring users to enter a password that would be used to generate an encryption key that is never stored locally.

In order to mitigate this issue the user would be required to do more work. If the user is required to do more work, they’ll likely abandon Signal. Since Signal provides very good transport security (the messages are secure during the trip from one user to another) abandoning it could result in the user opting for an easier to use tool that didn’t provide as effective or any transport security, which would make them less secure overall.

iOS and many modern Android devices have an advantage in that they often have dedicated hardware that encryption keys can be written to but not read from. Once a key is written to the hardware data can be sent to it to be either encrypted or decrypted with that key. Many desktops and laptops have similar functionality thanks to Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) but those tend to require user setup first whereas the smartphone option tends to be seamless to the user.

There is another mitigation option here, which is to utilize full-disk encryption to encrypt all of the contents on your hard drive. While full-disk encryption won’t prevent resident malware from accessing Signal’s database, it will prevent the database from being copied from the computer by a thief or law enforcers (assuming they seized the computer when it was off instead of when the operating system was booted up and thus the decryption key for the drive was resident in memory).